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TeamViewer Remote Clients for Windows, prior to version 15.58.4, contain a vulnerability in the TeamViewer_service.exe component where cryptographic signatures are not properly verified during the installation of printer drivers. This flaw allows a local, unprivileged attacker to bypass signature checks and install arbitrary drivers, potentially leading to privilege escalation.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2024-7479 and CVE-2024-7481, which are local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in TeamViewer for Windows. The exploit targets the TeamViewer SYSTEM service (TeamViewer_service.exe), which listens for IPC connections on localhost TCP port 5939. By spoofing the authentication handshake and sending a specially crafted IPC message, an unprivileged user can instruct the service to load an arbitrary kernel driver (SYS file) via a custom INF file, bypassing signature checks and GUI-based privilege restrictions. The exploit is implemented in C++ and consists of a Visual Studio project with supporting files for MD5 hashing, hexdump output, and IPC message structures. The main exploit logic resides in PoC.TV.Service.IPC/Main.cpp, which handles the socket communication, authentication spoofing, and driver installation request. The README provides detailed background, usage instructions, and references to advisories and blog posts. The exploit is version-dependent and may require minor modifications to match the target TeamViewer version. No remote or network attack is possible; the attack vector is strictly local, requiring code execution on the target machine.
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