CVE-2024-8856 is an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Backup and Staging by WP Time Capsule plugin for WordPress. All versions up to and including 1.22.21 are affected. The flaw is caused by missing file type validation in UploadHandler.php together with the absence of direct file access prevention, allowing attacker-supplied files to be uploaded to the server without adequate restriction. Because the application does not properly constrain uploaded content to safe file types, an unauthenticated attacker can place arbitrary files on the target system. In environments where uploaded files are stored in a web-accessible location and executable server-side content is permitted, this can be leveraged to achieve remote code execution.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
Repository contains two distinct PoCs/scanners: 1) CVE-2024-8856 (WordPress WP Time Capsule) unauthenticated file upload leading to RCE: - PoC/src/scanner.py: a simple vulnerability scanner that POSTs a PHP file to /wp-content/plugins/wp-time-capsule/wp-tcapsule-bridge/upload/php/index_REAL.php and flags vulnerable if HTTP 200 is returned. - PoC/src/scanner_real.py: a more operational RCE PoC. It generates PHP payloads that run system commands (ping/id/whoami/uname, read /etc/os-release, php -v) and writes a proof file under /tmp. After upload, it attempts to trigger execution by requesting guessed locations for the uploaded file (under wp-content/uploads, plugin tmp, and wp-time-capsule uploads). It records partial output as evidence and writes results to real_rce_result.json. - Stand/docker-compose.yml + Stand/init-plugin.sh: a local lab environment. docker-compose provisions WordPress (exposed on localhost:9999) and MariaDB; init-plugin.sh installs wp-time-capsule.1.22.21.zip, activates it via WP-CLI, and creates the vulnerable directory structure. 2) CVE-2024-39205 (js2py sandbox escape) educational demonstration: - PoC/src/scanner_real2.py: crafts a JavaScript payload that traverses Python object internals to locate subprocess.Popen and execute a single “safe” ping command to a user-supplied IP. It sends a raw HTTP POST to /flash/addcrypted2 with parameters package, crypted (base64 dummy), and jk (URL-encoded JS payload). Verification is done by running tcpdump locally to detect an ICMP echo from the target to the tester. Outputs/artifacts: - PoC/src/scan_result.json and PoC/src/real_rce_result.json are example result formats; PoC/result.txt shows a sample run against http://localhost:9999. Overall purpose: provide a vulnerable WordPress stand and scripts to (a) detect and (b) demonstrate/collect evidence of RCE via WP Time Capsule upload endpoint (CVE-2024-8856), plus a separate educational sandbox-escape demonstration script for CVE-2024-39205 targeting an HTTP /flash/addcrypted2 endpoint.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in WP Time Capsule included in the actor's tooling.
A remote code execution vulnerability in the WordPress Time Capsule plugin, referenced as a Metasploit module PR.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.