CVE-2025-0087 is a high-severity Android Framework elevation-of-privilege vulnerability affecting Android 13, 14, and 15. The uninstaller activity's creation flow lacks a required permission check, allowing a locally executing attacker to cause the uninstallation of an application belonging to a different Android user. No user interaction or additional execution privileges are required.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2025-0087, targeting the Android Package Installer ('com.android.packageinstaller'). The main file, 'CVE-2025-0087_dos.js', is a Frida script written in JavaScript. It hooks the 'loadLabel()' method of the 'PackageItemInfo' class to inject a 5000-character string as the label, which is intended to test for truncation or overflow vulnerabilities in the Package Installer's UI. If the vulnerability exists, this could result in a denial of service or UI malfunction. The exploit is local and requires Frida to inject the script into the target process. The repository also includes a minimal README indicating its purpose as a DoS PoC.
This repository provides a comprehensive exploit chain for CVE-2025-0087, targeting Android devices (API 34 and below). The main components are Frida JavaScript scripts (CVE-2025-0087.js, EoP+Persistance.js, EoP_Persistance_Factory_Reset_Persistance) that exploit the Android Package Installer to escalate privileges to root, enable ADB debugging, and establish persistence across reboots and even factory resets. The scripts attempt multiple vectors: direct root shell, tapjacking using SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW, intent hijacking, and persistence via system file modifications (e.g., /system/bin/run-as, /system/etc/install-recovery.sh, init.d, rc.local). The frida_bind.js script establishes a persistent bind shell on TCP port 4444 for remote access. The build.py and build_persistance.py scripts automate the creation of malicious APKs that embed these exploits and set up persistence, including downloading further payloads from a remote server (http://malicious-server.com/exploit.js). The repository is operational, providing working exploit code and persistence mechanisms, and is not just a proof-of-concept. It targets Android devices, specifically the Package Installer, and leverages both local and network attack vectors. The code is structured for use with Frida and for building APKs that can be installed as system apps for deeper persistence.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
7 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.