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A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in langgenius/dify version 0.10.2, specifically in the 'Create Knowledge' feature when uploading DOCX files. If the uploaded DOCX file contains an external relationship, the reltype value is fetched as a URL using the 'requests' module instead of the intended 'ssrf_proxy', allowing an attacker to trigger arbitrary outbound HTTP requests from the server. This issue is resolved in version 0.11.0.
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This repository is a CTF challenge simulating CVE-2025-0184, a DOCX SSRF vulnerability in langgenius/dify. The structure includes Dockerfiles for the main web service and internal services (admin, db, cache, metrics), a Makefile for orchestration, and a docker-compose.yml that sets up the environment with appropriate networking. The main web application (src/app.py) accepts DOCX uploads, parses external relationships, and (insecurely) fetches external resources referenced in the DOCX, making it vulnerable to SSRF. The exploit (exploits/exploit_generator.py) generates DOCX files with external relationships pointing to internal admin endpoints, attempting to retrieve the flag by exploiting the SSRF. The admin service (src/admin_service.py) exposes a /admin endpoint on port 3003, protected by a token, and returns the flag if accessed with the correct token. The exploit demonstrates bypasses for basic SSRF filters (using various localhost representations). The repository is operational, with a working exploit and a realistic vulnerable environment, and is not part of a larger exploit framework.
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