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CVE-2025-15545 is a command injection vulnerability in a product's backup restore functionality. The restore routine does not properly validate or reject unexpected/unrecognized tags embedded in a backup file. When a crafted backup is restored, the injected tag content is interpreted by a shell, enabling execution of attacker-supplied commands. The commands execute with root privileges, resulting in full compromise of the affected system.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a single Python exploit (`exploit.py`) plus README and MIT license. It targets TP-Link Archer RE605X v3.0 firmware RE605X(EU)_V3_1.1.5 Build 20240905 and references CVE-2025-15545. Core exploit chain implemented in `exploit.py`: 1) Local-network MITM setup: enables Linux IP forwarding (`/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward`) and launches two `arpspoof` processes to poison ARP between the victim client and the repeater. 2) Credential/session interception: uses Scapy to sniff victim TCP traffic and regex-extracts `stok` (32-hex token in URL path) and `sysauth` (32-hex cookie) from HTTP payloads. 3) Authenticated config backup: with intercepted `stok`/`sysauth`, uses `curl` to POST `operation=backup` to the repeater’s LuCI endpoint and saves the encrypted backup as `config.bin`. 4) Config decryption/repackaging: decrypts `config.bin` using user-supplied AES key/IV (CBC) and zlib decompression in multiple stages to recover `config.xml`. 5) Command injection payload insertion: appends a crafted XML fragment containing shell metacharacters and a netcat FIFO reverse shell back to the attacker on TCP/4444. 6) Re-encryption and restore: recompresses and re-encrypts the modified XML into a new `config.bin` and uploads it via `operation=restore` to trigger the vulnerable XML configuration parser, achieving root RCE. Notable characteristics: - Requires root on attacker machine (ARP spoofing/sniffing). - Uses external tools (`arpspoof`, `curl`) and Python libs (Scapy, PyCryptodome). - Payload is operational but largely hardcoded (reverse shell port 4444; command string embedded), with attacker IP auto-derived from local hostname resolution.
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