Loading vulnerability…
Mattermost fails to properly validate board blocks during Boards import in versions 10.4.x through 10.4.1, 9.11.x through 9.11.7, 10.3.x through 10.3.2, and 10.2.x through 10.2.2. By supplying a specially crafted Boards import archive and then exporting/import-processing it through the Boards functionality, an attacker can cause the application to access files outside the intended scope and read arbitrary files from the underlying system. The issue is consistent with improper path or file reference validation during archive import handling.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a working Bash proof-of-concept for CVE-2025-25279, targeting Mattermost 10.4.1's Focalboard component. It is not part of a major exploit framework. The repository is small and primarily consists of documentation plus a single exploit script at live/share/exploit.sh and a Vagrant lab definition at live/vm1/Vagrantfile. The exploit script performs a full authenticated exploitation chain against a Mattermost server: it prompts for a Personal Access Token, validates the token via /api/v4/users/me, retrieves a team ID, creates a new Focalboard board, creates a card, then adds a crafted attachment block whose fileId is a traversal path such as ../../../../../../../etc/passwd. It then duplicates the card to trigger the vulnerable server-side behavior, exports the board as a ZIP archive, unpacks it locally, and searches the archive for the targeted file path suffix. If found, it prints the beginning of the exfiltrated file. The default target is /etc/passwd, but the README and comments show how to switch to /opt/mattermost/config/config.json. Repository structure: README.md explains setup and exploitation steps; live/share/exploit.sh contains the actual PoC logic; live/vm1/Vagrantfile exposes guest port 8065 to the host for a local demo Mattermost instance; refs/README.md contains external references; docs/ and refs/ mostly contain placeholders; src is just a pointer-like stub to live/share/src/. The omitted target/ directory is referenced in the README as the location for building the vulnerable Mattermost Vagrant box. Overall purpose: provide a reproducible lab and exploit demonstration for authenticated arbitrary file read/path traversal in Mattermost Focalboard. Main capability is server-side file exfiltration through web API abuse, not code execution.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.