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Xorcom CompletePBX contains an authenticated command injection vulnerability in the administrator Task Scheduler functionality. Insufficient sanitization or neutralization of user-controlled input in scheduler-related parameters allows an authenticated attacker to inject arbitrary operating system commands, which are then executed by the underlying system shell. According to the provided content, successful exploitation results in arbitrary command execution as the root user. The issue affects all CompletePBX versions up to and prior to 5.2.35.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting Xorcom CompletePBX (<= 5.2.35) for authenticated command injection via the web-based task scheduler. The exploit requires valid superadmin (admin) credentials and abuses the 'parameters' field of the scheduler to inject and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. The module automates the process: it logs in, creates a malicious scheduled task with a payload, executes the task to trigger code execution, and then cleans up by deleting the task. The exploit is operational and provides remote code execution, typically resulting in a reverse shell or Meterpreter session. The attack vector is network-based, targeting the HTTP interface of CompletePBX. The module references CVE-2025-30004 and is suitable for use against vulnerable Linux/Unix deployments of CompletePBX.
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