CVE-2025-32965 describes a supply-chain compromise affecting the xrpl.js JavaScript/TypeScript SDK published to npm as xrpl. Versions 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4, and 2.14.2 were published with malicious code embedded in the package. The malicious functionality was designed to exfiltrate private keys and other secrets from applications or developer environments using the compromised library to interact with the XRP Ledger. The issue is not a conventional memory-safety or input-validation flaw in a legitimate function; rather, the distributed package itself was backdoored, causing consumers who installed the affected versions to execute attacker-controlled code as part of normal package use.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) for CVE-2025-32965, demonstrating a supply chain attack on the xrpl.js library (versions 4.2.1–4.2.4 and 2.14.2). The exploit consists of a malicious module (fake_xrpl.js) that exfiltrates the generated wallet seed to an attacker-controlled HTTP endpoint (http://poc-listener:3000/xcm). The repository includes Docker configuration to set up an isolated test environment with two containers: one acting as the victim (generating and leaking the seed) and one as the attacker (receiving the seed). The main exploit logic is in fake_xrpl.js, which is invoked by test.js. The server.js file implements the attacker's listener. The repository structure is clear, with code files for the PoC, a Dockerfile for environment setup, and a detailed README explaining the vulnerability, setup, and demonstration steps. No real-world endpoints are hardcoded; the PoC uses a local Docker network for demonstration.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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