Dell Command Monitor (DCM) versions prior to 10.12.3.28 contain an execution with unnecessary privileges vulnerability. According to the provided information, a low-privileged local attacker can exploit the issue to elevate privileges. Specific vulnerable components, functions, or code paths are not provided in the available content.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains two standalone Python exploit tools and a README describing an unauthenticated Magento/Adobe Commerce file-upload-to-RCE chain. The exploit flow is consistent across both scripts: query /graphql for a valid product SKU, create a guest cart through /rest/default/V1/guest-carts, abuse custom_options file_info in /rest/default/V1/guest-carts/{cart_id}/items to upload base64-encoded content, and then probe predictable media paths for the uploaded file. Both scripts generate or accept PHP payloads; by default they wrap PHP in a valid PNG polyglot so the file appears to be an image while remaining executable if served by PHP. magento_godzilla.py is the batch-oriented scanner/exploitation tool: it supports multithreaded processing of many URLs, writes results incrementally, and includes a built-in eval webshell payload that camouflages GET requests as a fake 404 page while executing POST-supplied PHP when the configured parameter is present. It also defines a benign probe payload to verify upload and PHP execution with lower detection risk. magento_upload.py is a single-target operator tool for manual exploitation: it can upload a local file, arbitrary inline PHP code, or raw content without PNG wrapping, optionally accept a user-supplied SKU, and probe several candidate upload paths after upload. Overall, this is a real operational exploit repository for unauthenticated web-based RCE via Magento guest cart file upload abuse, not merely a detector.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.