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CVE-2025-45422 is an incorrect access control vulnerability in Proximus b-box firmware version 8c.725A. The flaw allows an authenticated attacker to bypass intended authorization restrictions in the router’s management functionality and make arbitrary changes to port forwarding rules. By abusing insufficient enforcement of access controls around this configuration area, an attacker with valid access to the administrative interface can alter how inbound traffic is forwarded to internal hosts and services.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone Python proof-of-concept/operational exploit for CVE-2025-45422, documented as affecting Proximus b-box 3 routers running firmware 8c.725A. The repo contains only two files: a README explaining the vulnerability and a single Python script implementing the exploit logic. The main script, cve-2025-45422.py, uses pycurl to send SOAP requests directly to the router’s UPnP WANPPPConnection control endpoint at /upnp/control/WANPPPConn0 on hardcoded LAN host 192.168.1.1. It tries ports 49152 and 49153, indicating the author observed the UPnP control service on either port. Core capabilities include: (1) adding arbitrary TCP or UDP port mappings via AddPortMapping, including attacker-controlled internal client IP, internal/external ports, description, and lease duration; (2) enumerating existing mappings by repeatedly calling GetGenericPortMappingEntry with an index; and (3) deleting mappings with DeletePortMapping. The README also notes the persistence angle: mappings may not be permanently removable from the router GUI, while UPnP clients can recreate or re-enable them. Operationally, this is a LAN-side network exploit rather than remote Internet exploitation. It does not deliver shellcode or code execution on the router; instead, it abuses weak access control in UPnP to manipulate NAT/port-forwarding state. The practical impact is unauthorized exposure of internal services, stealthier temporary exposure through lease durations, and persistence/lateral movement opportunities inside the victim network. The script is interactive and appears intended both for demonstrating exploitation and for remediation/testing by enumerating and removing problematic mappings.
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2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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