CVE-2025-4602 affects the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress in all versions up to and including 1.2.5. The vulnerability is an arbitrary file read in the plugin's get_file() function, which allows an attacker to retrieve the contents of files from the underlying server. According to the provided information, exploitation is possible without authentication when the plugin is deployed with the default password left unchanged as 1:1, or otherwise when an attacker has obtained valid credentials. Successful exploitation can expose sensitive local files and configuration data stored on the server.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept exploit (CVE-2025-4602.py) and a detailed README for a critical vulnerability in eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5. The exploit leverages a weak authentication mechanism (default credentials and predictable hash) in the plugin's remote management protocol, accessible via the '/?connector=bridge' HTTP endpoint. By using the default credentials, the script obtains a session key and then issues a request to read arbitrary files from the server, such as 'wp-config.php'. The exploit is unauthenticated if the default credentials are unchanged, and the README provides technical details, vulnerable code snippets, and reproduction steps. The repository is structured with a single Python exploit script and a comprehensive markdown README. The main attack vector is network-based, targeting the plugin's HTTP endpoint.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
4 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.