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eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce for WordPress versions through 1.2.5 contains insufficient file-path validation in the delete_file() function. The flaw permits arbitrary file deletion on the server. Deletion of certain WordPress files, including wp-config.php, can facilitate remote code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept exploit (CVE-2025-4603.py) and a detailed README for a critical vulnerability in the eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce WordPress plugin (versions <= 1.2.5). The exploit leverages the plugin's default credentials and insecure session key mechanism to perform unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion via the '?connector=bridge' HTTP endpoint. The Python script automates the attack: it generates the required hash from default credentials, obtains a session key, and then issues a file deletion request for any file path specified by the attacker (e.g., 'wp-config.php'). The README provides technical details, including the vulnerable code flow, default credential values, and the HTTP requests involved. The exploit is a working proof-of-concept and demonstrates a severe risk to affected WordPress installations where the plugin is present and default credentials are unchanged.
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4 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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