CVE-2025-4660 is a remote code execution vulnerability affecting the Windows agent component of SecureConnector. The issue is caused by improper access controls on a named pipe exposed by the agent. The pipe is accessible to the Everyone group and does not restrict remote connections, which allows unauthenticated network-based attackers to connect to it. By interacting with the named pipe, an attacker can redirect the agent to communicate with an attacker-controlled rogue server, which can then issue commands through the SecureConnector Agent. The vulnerability is described as affecting Windows only and does not impact Linux or macOS Secure Connector deployments.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2025-4660, a remote code execution vulnerability in Forescout SecureConnector for Windows. The repository contains two main Python scripts: 1. forescout_redirect.py: This is the exploit script that connects to the SecureConnector agent's named pipe (\\<target_host>\pipe\_FS_SC_UNINSTALL_PIPE) and sends a specially crafted packet to redirect the agent to an attacker-controlled IP and port. This enables the attacker to hijack the agent's communication channel. 2. forescout_c2.py: This script implements a simple command-and-control (C2) server that speaks the SecureConnector protocol. Once an agent is redirected, the C2 server can interact with it, issuing commands such as directory listing, process listing, file retrieval, and arbitrary shell command execution via a custom XML-based protocol. The exploit requires the attacker to have network access to the target system and the ability to connect to the named pipe. The C2 server provides an interactive shell for managing compromised agents. The repository is structured as a PoC and does not include weaponized or automated exploitation features.
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No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.