CVE-2025-48507 is a high-severity vulnerability in Arm Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) caused by the security state of the calling processor not being used when handling calls into TF-A. As described in the provided content, this improper handling can allow a non-secure processor context to reach functionality or resources that should be restricted to the secure world. The resulting exposure could permit non-secure processors to access secure memory regions, invoke or access cryptographic operations, and control SoC subsystems by turning them on or off. The issue is therefore a trust-boundary enforcement failure in TF-A’s handling of caller security context.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2025-48507 and CVE-2025-0038, targeting AMD Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoCs and related platforms. The exploit demonstrates how a non-secure Linux environment can break TrustZone isolation and gain access to secure memory regions. The attack is performed in two main stages: (1) a kernel module (smc-tt.c) is used to issue arbitrary SMC calls to clear security registers (IOU_AXI_WPRTCN and IOU_AXI_RPRTCN at 0xFF240000), reclassifying the SD Host Controller as a secure master; (2) a modified SDHC driver and a bash script (dma_patch.sh) are used to perform DMA attacks, writing arbitrary payloads to secure memory via a device partition (e.g., /dev/mmcblk0p3). The repository includes hardware debugger scripts for Trace32 to assist in debugging and confirming the attack, as well as documentation and build instructions. The exploit requires root access, the ability to load kernel modules, and a vulnerable hardware/software configuration. No network endpoints are involved; all actions are performed locally on the target device.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.