CVE-2025-49136 affects listmonk, a self-hosted newsletter and mailing list manager. In listmonk versions starting from 4.0.0 and before 5.0.2, the Sprig template functions env and expandenv are enabled by default. These functions allow template authors to read and expand environment variables from the host system. In multi-user deployments, a non-super-admin user who has permission to create or edit campaigns or templates can inject template expressions such as {{ env }} to access sensitive environment variables available to the listmonk process. This results in unintended disclosure of host-level secrets to lower-privileged application users.
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env and expandenv expressions and review logs or administrative history for potential abuse.1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module targeting Listmonk (versions >=4.0.0 and <5.0.2) for an environment variable disclosure vulnerability (CVE-2025-49136). The exploit abuses insecure Sprig template functions (env and expandenv) enabled by default in vulnerable Listmonk versions. By authenticating as a user with campaign permissions, the module creates a campaign with a malicious template payload that reads environment variables from the server. The module then previews the campaign to trigger the template rendering and extracts the values of sensitive environment variables (such as database credentials and application addresses). The module cleans up by deleting the campaign after extraction. The exploit requires valid credentials and network access to the Listmonk admin interface. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit auxiliary module, making it operational and easy to use within the Metasploit framework.
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