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CVE-2025-53104 is a command injection vulnerability in the gluestack/gluestack-ui repository’s GitHub Actions workflow discussion-to-slack.yml, present prior to commit e6b4271. The vulnerable workflow processed untrusted GitHub Discussion fields such as title and body and directly interpolated those attacker-controlled values into shell commands within a run: block. Because the workflow was triggered on discussion creation, an attacker could submit a crafted discussion containing shell metacharacters or command substitution payloads such as $(curl ...), causing arbitrary commands to execute on the GitHub Actions runner. The issue was fixed by removing the vulnerable discussion-to-slack.yml workflow in commit e6b4271.
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This 100-file repository is an automated research snapshot of the gluestack-ui project, explicitly described in its README as a disposable laboratory artifact for reproducing public GitHub Actions workflow vulnerabilities. It is primarily a JavaScript/TypeScript React Native and Storybook UI repository, with GitHub Actions YAML workflows and a Python issue-assignment helper. It is not a conventional standalone exploit tool, but it contains a reproducible vulnerable workflow configuration. The security-relevant file is `.github/workflows/discussion-to-slack.yml`. On every newly created discussion, its `Get discussion details` shell step directly embeds untrusted discussion title, body, URL, author, and category expressions into `echo` commands. Because these values are not safely quoted or passed through a robust serializer, crafted discussion content can alter shell syntax and execute commands on the GitHub-hosted runner. These values are written to `$GITHUB_OUTPUT` and consumed by the following Slack notification action. The workflow exposes a Slack bot token only to the later action step; the vulnerable shell step does not explicitly receive that token. Other workflows perform normal CI testing against local Expo/Next.js servers, publishing, documentation dispatch, and GitHub issue/PR automation, and are ancillary to the primary finding.
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