Loading vulnerability…
A command injection vulnerability exists in the upnp_relay() function in multiple ipTIME router models. The controlURL value used to pass port-forwarding information to an upper router is passed to system() without proper validation or sanitization, enabling injection of arbitrary shell metacharacters/commands and resulting in OS command execution on the device.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository is a focused educational reproduction of CVE-2025-55423 affecting ipTIME A604M firmware. It is not a generic framework module; it contains both exploit scaffolding and extensive reverse-engineering documentation. The core exploit chain is: a fake SSDP server answers WAN-side M-SEARCH, a fake HTTP server serves a crafted UPnP device description XML whose first controlURL contains shell metacharacters, the target firmware's internal upnpc accepts that IGD and prints/stores the resulting URL as igd_url, and the vulnerable upnp_relay function later builds a shell command using '/sbin/upnpc -u <igd_url> ...' via system2/system, causing command injection. Repository structure: 6 markdown docs explain background, attack scenario, vulnerable function analysis, miniupnpc chain tracing, attacker server setup, and QEMU-based RCE triggering. The actual code lives under exploits/: ssdp_server.py implements UDP SSDP discovery responses; http_server.py serves attacker.xml and the two SOAP POST responses required by miniupnpc (GetStatusInfo and GetExternalIPAddress); attacker.xml is the malicious UPnP description document with injected controlURL; call_rce.c is a QEMU mipsel user-mode harness that dlopens firmware libraries, sets igd_url directly, and invokes upnp_relay to prove the sink; stub.c overrides hardware-dependent WAN functions so the harness works without real router hardware. Main exploit capabilities: (1) network impersonation of an upstream IGD over SSDP/HTTP, (2) delivery of attacker-controlled controlURL into the target's igd_url state, and (3) triggering command injection/RCE through upnp_relay. The included payloads are basic hardcoded shell-command markers (;PWNED, ';touch /tmp/pwned;#'), so maturity is operational rather than weaponized. The repo is a real exploit reproduction, not merely detection, though it intentionally omits DHCP hijack/ARP spoof automation and firmware binaries.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
5 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.