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CVE-2025-60012 is an important-severity authorization flaw in Apache Livy. Apache Livy 0.7.0 and 0.8.0 are affected when they are connected to Apache Spark 3.1 or later. The issue arises because a user can submit a request through Livy containing arbitrary Spark configuration values, including configuration options supported starting in Spark 3.1, and cause Livy/Spark to access files that the user should not be permitted to read. In effect, Livy does not sufficiently restrict or validate certain user-supplied Spark configuration parameters, enabling unauthorized file access across permission boundaries.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept and analysis bundle for CVE-2025-60012 affecting Apache Livy. It is not a standalone weaponized exploit framework; instead it combines documentation, a vulnerable/fixed Docker lab, and a vendored copy of Apache Livy 0.8.0 source to explain and reproduce unauthorized local file access. Core exploit capability: an authenticated user of Livy’s REST or JDBC interface can cause Livy/Spark to reference local files outside the configured whitelist. The README describes two attack paths: (1) spark.archives is not included in Livy 0.8.0’s hardcoded list of file-valued Spark configs, so values like file:///etc/passwd bypass local-dir whitelist validation entirely; and (2) validated paths are checked with a raw startsWith comparison, allowing traversal strings such as /whitelisted/dir/../../etc/passwd to pass the whitelist check before resolving outside the allowed directory. The result is unauthorized file disclosure / access, not code execution. Repository structure: the top level contains a detailed README, license, and two Docker environments under docker/vulnerable and docker/fixed. The vulnerable Docker image installs Spark 3.1.3 and Livy 0.8.0-incubating, binds Livy on 0.0.0.0:8998, whitelists /opt/safe-data, and creates a target file at /opt/sensitive/secret.txt outside the whitelist. The fixed image mirrors the setup with Livy 0.9.0-incubating to demonstrate remediation. The large livy-0.8.0 subtree is mostly upstream Apache Livy source code, including Java/Scala client libraries, shell scripts, Docker development assets, and tests. It provides context for how Livy’s HTTP client and REST paths work, but the actual PoC logic is primarily documented in README and environment configuration rather than a dedicated exploit script. Notable network/REST behavior from included Livy code: the Java and Python client components interact with Livy session endpoints such as /sessions, /sessions/{id}, /sessions/{id}/statements, /sessions/{id}/jobs/{jobId}, and /sessions/{id}/jobs/{jobId}/cancel. The included dev/livy-shell script shows how a user can create sessions and submit statements over HTTP. Overall, the repository’s purpose is to reproduce, explain, and compare vulnerable versus fixed behavior for a file-access vulnerability in Apache Livy.
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