Loading vulnerability…
An issue in the WiseDelfile64.sys component of WiseCleaner Wise Force Deleter 7.3.2 and earlier allows attackers to delete arbitrary files via a crafted request.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone Windows local exploit utility, not tied to a larger framework. It contains one C source file (WiseDelete.c), a README, and a license. The code is a user-mode wrapper around the vulnerable WiseDelfile64.sys kernel driver associated with CVE-2025-66680. Its purpose is to load the driver on demand, establish the expected handshake with the device, and then invoke the driver's privileged deletion functionality against attacker-supplied paths. The exploit flow is straightforward: parse command-line arguments, locate WiseDelfile64.sys in the current working directory, enable SeLoadDriverPrivilege, create the service registry key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WiseDelfile, set the ImagePath to the NT path form of the driver, call native driver-loading routines from ntdll, open the device \\.\WiseDelfile, send a handshake using hardcoded magic values, and finally issue the delete IOCTL for each supplied target path. The tool supports comma-separated multiple targets and a -folder flag for recursive directory deletion. After use, it unloads the driver and cleans up. Capabilities are limited but operational: it does not provide code execution or persistence, but it does provide arbitrary file/folder deletion via a trusted kernel driver interface, which can be impactful for defense evasion, destructive actions, or removal of protected files. The repository appears to be a real exploit implementation rather than a detector or placeholder, and its hardcoded workflow and payload make it best classified as OPERATIONAL.
Repository contains a Windows local exploit client for CVE-2025-66680 affecting Wise Force Deleter (<= 1.5.7.59). The code is a Visual Studio C++ console application that (1) loads a kernel driver from a hardcoded path (C:\Windows\WiseDelfile64.sys) by creating a SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER service named "WiseDelfile", (2) opens the device object \\.\WiseDelfile, (3) bypasses the driver’s caller/process verification by sending IOCTL 0x222400 with a crafted VERIFY_STRUCT (PID, magicNumber=20, drvName="WiseDelfile"), and (4) force-deletes arbitrary files by sending IOCTL 0x220004 with an NT-style path string ("\\??\\<path>") for each line in an operator-supplied list (default file.txt). After processing, it stops and deletes the driver service. Structure: 1 C++ source file implementing driver load/unload + IOCTL logic, plus Visual Studio solution/project files (.sln/.vcxproj) and a README describing usage. No network functionality is present; the only external URLs are README links (image and donation). The vulnerable driver itself is explicitly not included, so the repo provides an operational exploit client but depends on the operator obtaining the driver separately.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.