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A local information disclosure vulnerability exists in the Ludashi Windows driver prior to version 5.1025 due to missing access control in an IOCTL handler. The driver exposes a device interface accessible to unprivileged users and accepts attacker-controlled input structures that specify physical addresses (notably within the lower 4GB). The IOCTL handler maps attacker-chosen physical memory using MmMapIoSpace and copies the mapped contents back to user mode without validating caller privileges or constraining the target address range, enabling arbitrary physical memory reads and disclosure of sensitive kernel-resident data.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small local Windows proof-of-concept for CVE-2025-67246, an incorrect access control / arbitrary physical memory read issue in the LuDaShi driver ComputerZ_x64.sys. The repository contains only two files: a README describing the vulnerability and exploitation conditions, and a single C source file implementing the PoC. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. The main exploit logic is in poc.c. It defines a packed input structure with a 32-bit physical address and a 64-bit byte count, prompts the user for a target address, opens the device \\.\ComputerZ, and sends IOCTL 0xF1002508 via DeviceIoControl. The PoC requests 8 bytes and prints the returned buffer in hex. This demonstrates that the driver exposes a user-accessible interface that can map and return physical memory contents from attacker-chosen addresses in the lower 4GB. Operationally, this is a local information disclosure exploit rather than code execution. Its core capability is reading arbitrary physical memory through the vulnerable driver, which can leak sensitive kernel or system data and weaken OS memory isolation. The code is minimal and hardcoded for a simple demonstration, so the maturity is best classified as POC.
Repository contains a proof-of-concept for CVE-2025-67246 affecting LuDaShi system utility products that ship/load the ComputerZ_x64.sys driver (versions < 6.1026.4505.112). The vulnerability is an incorrect access control / insufficient validation in an IOCTL handler (0xF1002508) that allows a user-mode caller to supply an arbitrary physical address in the lower 4GB; the driver maps/reads that memory (described as via MmMapIoSpace) and returns the contents to user space, enabling local kernel/physical memory disclosure. Structure: - README.md: Vulnerability description, affected versions, IOCTL code, device name (ComputerZ), and explanation of how the driver maps arbitrary lower-4GB addresses; includes screenshots. - poc.c: Windows C program entry point (main) that prompts for a target address, opens the device \\.\ComputerZ, sends DeviceIoControl with IOCTL 0xF1002508 and a packed struct { ULONG PhysicalAddress; ULONG64 NumberOfBytes; }, and prints the returned bytes (buffer size hardcoded to 8). Capabilities: - Local information disclosure by reading arbitrary physical memory (lower 4GB) through the vulnerable driver interface. - No privilege escalation or code execution is implemented; it is a memory-read PoC with a fixed 8-byte output buffer (though the struct includes NumberOfBytes, suggesting the driver may support variable-length reads).
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