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MindsDB versions prior to 25.11.1 contain an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API. In the PUT handler implemented in file.py, when the request body is JSON and source_type is not "url", user-controlled path/filename data is directly joined into a filesystem path without sanitization (no clear_filename or equivalent). Multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization, but JSON uploads do not, enabling an attacker to traverse paths and access arbitrary files readable by the MindsDB process and move them into MindsDB-managed storage.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a minimal Python proof-of-concept for CVE-2025-68472 (2 files: a short exploit script and a README with screenshots). The script uses the requests library to target a web API at a user-supplied base URL (hardcoded placeholder 'targetURL'). It performs: 1) PUT {base}/api/files/leak_rel with JSON body {"file": "../../../../../etc/passwd"}, indicating a directory traversal/LFI-style primitive where the server reads a file path provided by the client. 2) POST {base}/api/sql/query with JSON {"query": "SELECT * FROM files.leak_rel"} to retrieve the leaked content/rows from a database table/view named files.leak_rel. Outputs include HTTP status/text for the PUT and pretty-printed JSON for the SQL query response. No scanning, auth handling, or payload customization beyond editing base/payload is included, consistent with a basic PoC.
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6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.