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Traccar (open-source GPS tracking) versions up to and including 6.11.1 contain a Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) issue in the /api/socket WebSocket endpoint. During the WebSocket handshake, the server does not validate the Origin header, allowing a malicious website to initiate a cross-origin WebSocket connection to the Traccar instance from a victim’s browser. Because the browser will attach the victim’s existing session credentials (e.g., JSESSIONID) to the request, the attacker can establish an authenticated, full-duplex WebSocket session as the victim, bypassing Same Origin Policy expectations for the application’s WebSocket interface.
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What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
/api/socket (e.g., reading sensitive tracking/telemetry data available to the victim account and issuing state-changing commands available to that account), subject to the victim’s privileges.If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Origin validation (and/or an application-layer CSRF token bound to the WebSocket handshake) for /api/socket, rejecting cross-origin handshakes. As compensating controls, restrict access to the Traccar web interface and WebSocket endpoint to trusted origins/networks (e.g., via reverse proxy allowlists/VPN), and ensure session cookies are configured defensively (e.g., SameSite where compatible), though SameSite alone is not a complete defense for WebSockets across all scenarios.Patch, then assume compromise.
No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 2 candidates as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.