CVE-2025-69516 is a server-side template injection vulnerability in Amidaware Tactical RMM affecting versions equal to or earlier than v1.3.1. The flaw is present in the /reporting/templates/preview/ endpoint, where the user-controlled template_md parameter is improperly sanitized and then passed into Jinja2 template processing. According to the provided content, the issue stems from misuse of the generate_html() function, which inserts attacker-controlled input into env.from_string, causing arbitrary Jinja2 template evaluation. An authenticated low-privileged user with Report Viewer or Report Manager permissions can exploit this behavior to inject Jinja2 expressions and achieve remote command execution on the Tactical RMM server.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a small standalone exploit PoC consisting of two files: a README and a single Python script, xpl.py. The script is the main entry point and implements an authenticated network exploit for CVE-2025-69516 against Tactical RMM. It targets the reporting template preview functionality at /reporting/templates/preview/, building a JSON POST request that places a malicious Jinja2 template in the template_md field. That template abuses Python introspection to reach __builtins__.__import__, import the os module, and run an attacker-supplied shell command with os.popen(), then returns the command output in the rendered response. Operationally, the exploit accepts three CLI parameters: target domain, API token, and command. It normalizes the target into an HTTPS URL, sets browser-like headers including Authorization: Token <token>, Origin, Referer, and User-Agent, disables TLS certificate verification, and submits the payload with requests.post(). It then prints status information and either parses JSON output or falls back to raw response text. Error handling covers common HTTP failures and connection/timeout exceptions. The exploit is not a framework module and is not merely a detector; it is a working command-execution PoC with a hardcoded exploitation method but user-controlled command input. The repository purpose is straightforward: provide a simple authenticated SSTI-to-RCE exploit for vulnerable Tactical RMM deployments, reportedly tested on version 1.3.1.
Repository contains a single operational Python exploit script (xpl.py) plus a README. The exploit targets CVE-2025-69516 in Tactical RMM (README claims tested on 1.3.1) and achieves authenticated remote code execution by abusing a Jinja2 Server-Side Template Injection in the reporting template preview functionality. Structure & flow: - README.md: describes CVE, target product, and example usage: python xpl.py -d <api-domain> -t <session token> -c "id". - xpl.py: CLI tool that builds a POST request to /reporting/templates/preview/ on the supplied domain (defaults to https if scheme not provided). It crafts a malicious Jinja2 template (template_md) that traverses Python internals to access __builtins__, imports os, runs os.popen(command), and embeds the output into the rendered template. The script sends JSON with template fields (type=markdown, format=html) and includes headers such as Authorization: Token <token>, Origin, and Referer. It prints status code/length and attempts to parse the response as JSON, otherwise prints raw text. Notable operational characteristics: - Network-based exploit over HTTPS; disables TLS verification (verify=False) and suppresses urllib3 warnings. - Requires a valid Tactical RMM API token; handles common HTTP errors (401/403/404). - Payload is user-supplied command string executed on the server; no reverse shell or persistence is implemented by default.
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