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Shirt Pocket SuperDuper! 3.11 and earlier contains a local privilege escalation issue where a local attacker can modify the application’s default task template such that it installs an arbitrary macOS package. The installed package can execute shell scripts with root privileges and with Full Disk Access, enabling bypass of macOS privacy controls.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a bash PoC exploit (CVE-2025-69604.sh) and a detailed README. The exploit targets Shirt Pocket SuperDuper! on macOS by tampering with the user-writable “Default Settings” task template (Session Settings.sdss) to re-enable/abuse the product’s package-install feature. The script (1) builds a malicious installer package using pkgbuild with a preinstall script, (2) edits the SuperDuper default settings plist to set SDshouldInstallPackage=YES and SDinstallerPackage=/tmp/attack.pkg, and (3) writes the modified plist back into Session Settings.sdss. When the victim later runs a backup with default settings, SuperDuper installs the attacker package with root privileges and Full Disk Access. The included payload is a simple demonstration that lists the user’s Desktop and writes it to /Library/private_data.txt (root-owned), proving privileged execution and access to protected data. No network IOCs are present; all observables are local file paths and SuperDuper-specific settings keys. README notes mitigation in SuperDuper 3.12 (removal of install-package functionality) and that the PoC was demonstrated on 3.11.
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