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MediumPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2025-70795: Protected Process Termination in Safetica ProcessMonitorDriver

Published Apr 17, 2026 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVSS5.5Medium · v3.1
EPSS0.27%19th percentile
CISA KEVNoNot listed
In the wildReported5 exploitation records in Mallory
IdentifiersCVE-2025-70795CWE-863

CVE-2025-70795 is an insufficient caller-validation vulnerability in the IOCTL handler of Safetica STProcessMonitor 11.11.4.0. An attacker with administrative privileges can load the vulnerable driver and submit crafted requests that invoke kernel-mode process termination, bypassing third-party process protections. The vulnerability enables denial of service and security-tool disruption through bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver attacks. Related process-termination exposure is also documented in ProcessMonitorDriver 11.26.18, although its required control code and input structure differ from those of the initially described interface.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation can terminate protected third-party applications and critical services, causing denial of service. Terminating endpoint security processes can impair detection and prevention, facilitating subsequent malicious activity. Driver-assisted security-process termination associated with this vulnerability has been observed in The Gentlemen ransomware incidents; ransomware encryption and other downstream actions are separate capabilities, not direct effects of the vulnerability.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Restrict administrative privileges and unauthorized kernel-driver installation. Apply Microsoft's vulnerable-driver blocklist and App Control or WDAC policies to prevent vulnerable driver loading; enable the Defender ASR rule for abuse of vulnerable signed drivers and Memory Integrity where compatible. Monitor unexpected kernel-service creation, driver loading, and correlated termination of security processes. Validate controls against legitimate Safetica deployments before enforcement.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Safetica to a vendor-supported release that removes the vulnerable driver exposure, and remove obsolete vulnerable driver copies and service registrations where operationally safe. The exact fixed release is not available in the supplied information. Updating the installed application alone does not prevent an administrator-level attacker from introducing an older vulnerable driver; enforce driver-loading controls to address residual BYOVD exposure.

Public exploits

Exploits

2 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis.

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STProcessMonitorBYOVDRepository purpose/structure: - Visual Studio C++ solution implementing a local Windows BYOVD-style utility named STProcessMonitorBYOVD. - Core files: - STProcessMonitorBYOVD/Main.cpp: CLI entry point implementing driver load/unload and process termination actions. - STProcessMonitorBYOVD/Service.cpp: helper routines to create/start/stop/delete a kernel driver service via SCM. - STProcessMonitorBYOVD/FindProcess.cpp: enumerates processes via Toolhelp32 to resolve PIDs by process name. - STProcessMonitorBYOVD/TokenAdjust.cpp: enables SeDebugPrivilege (and SeTcbPrivilege, though unused in Main.cpp) for token/process access. - STProcessMonitorBYOVD/Struct.h + Functions.h: shared declarations. - Project includes two driver binaries as non-code artifacts: STProcessMonitor.sys and STProcessMonitorNew.sys. Exploit capabilities (what it actually does): - Driver installation (local): /Init computes the driver path as <exe_dir>\\STProcessMonitor.sys and installs it as a demand-start kernel driver service named "STProcessMonitor" using CreateServiceW + StartService. - Driver removal: /Uninst stops and deletes the service. - Arbitrary process termination via driver IOCTLs: - /Kill <names...>: opens device \\.\STProcessMonitorDriver and for each provided process name, finds all matching PIDs and sends IOCTL 0xB822200C with a TerminateProcessInfo{ProcessId=<pid>} buffer. - /Terminate <names...>: if already running as SYSTEM, performs the same PID-by-name loop but uses IOCTL 0xB822A00C. - Self-elevation to SYSTEM (local token theft): if not SYSTEM in /Terminate mode, it enables SeDebugPrivilege, locates a SYSTEM-owned winlogon.exe instance, duplicates its token (DuplicateTokenEx) and relaunches the current command line with CreateProcessWithTokenW to obtain a SYSTEM process, then expects the user to re-run/continue under SYSTEM. Notable targeting indicators: - README claims relation to CVE-2025-70795 and CVE-2026-0828, but the code itself is a generic BYOVD driver-control utility: it relies on a bundled driver exposing a known device name and IOCTLs to terminate processes. Network activity: - None in code. No HTTP/DNS/IP endpoints; all interaction is local (SCM + device IOCTL + process/token APIs).wutang700 · Disclosed Apr 20, 2024 · cpp · xml · local (BYOVD / kernel driver abuse via IOCTL)OperationalSTProcessMonitorBYOVDRepository purpose: a Windows C++ console tool demonstrating BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) abuse of the STProcessMonitor driver to terminate arbitrary processes, referencing CVE-2025-70795. It supports loading/unloading the driver as a kernel service and sending crafted IOCTLs to the driver’s device object to kill processes by PID resolved from process names. Key capabilities (from Main.cpp and helpers): - Driver service management: /Init creates a SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER service named "STProcessMonitor" pointing to a driver file expected next to the EXE ("\STProcessMonitor.sys"), then starts it (Service.cpp). /Uninst stops and deletes the service. - Process discovery: FindProcess.cpp enumerates processes via Toolhelp32 snapshot and returns all PIDs matching a provided executable name (case-insensitive). - Process termination via driver IOCTL: - /Kill <names...>: opens the device "\\.\STProcessMonitorDriver" and for each matching PID sends DeviceIoControl with code 0xB822200C and a small input struct containing the PID handle. README claims this path works “without any privilege” with driver version 11.11.4.0 (CVE-2025-70795). - /Terminate <names...>: intended for an updated driver (README mentions 11.26.18) that checks the caller is NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. The program first checks if it is already SYSTEM; if yes, it sends IOCTL 0xB822A00C to terminate processes. - Local privilege escalation to SYSTEM (to satisfy updated driver checks): if not SYSTEM, the tool enables SeDebugPrivilege, locates a SYSTEM-owned winlogon.exe, duplicates its token (DuplicateTokenEx), and relaunches itself with CreateProcessWithTokenW using the same command line. This is a token-theft style elevation that typically requires Administrator/SeDebugPrivilege. Repository structure: - STProcessMonitorBYOVD/Main.cpp: primary entry point implementing CLI parsing and the IOCTL abuse + SYSTEM relaunch logic. - STProcessMonitorBYOVD/Service.cpp: SCM routines to create/start/stop/delete the kernel driver service. - STProcessMonitorBYOVD/FindProcess.cpp: PID lookup by process name. - STProcessMonitorBYOVD/TokenAdjust.cpp: privilege enabling helpers (SeDebugPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege though SeTcb is not used in Main.cpp). - STProcessMonitorBYOVD/Struct.h + Functions.h: shared declarations. - Visual Studio solution/project files; project references two driver binaries (STProcessMonitor.sys and STProcessMonitorNew.sys), though the runtime path in code expects STProcessMonitor.sys in the EXE directory. Overall, this is a local Windows BYOVD exploit utility (not a network exploit) focused on abusing a vulnerable/abusable driver interface to terminate protected processes, with an added SYSTEM token duplication step for newer driver versions that restrict IOCTL callers.ANYLNK · Disclosed Feb 14, 2026 · cpp · xml · local (Windows BYOVD / kernel driver abuse via IOCTL)Operational
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2025-70795 exploited in the wild?
Yes. As of Oct 29, 2026, Mallory has reports of exploitation in the wild.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2025-70795?
Yes. Mallory tracks 2 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2025-70795, the earliest disclosed Apr 20, 2024.
Is there a patch for CVE-2025-70795?
Upgrade Safetica to a vendor-supported release that removes the vulnerable driver exposure, and remove obsolete vulnerable driver copies and service registrations where operationally safe. The exact fixed release is not available in the supplied information.
How severe is CVE-2025-70795?
CVE-2025-70795 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 5.5 (Medium) and an EPSS score of 0.27% (19th percentile) as of Oct 29, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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the hacker newsNews · Oct 29, 2026ThreatsDay: Critical Firewall Flaws, Banking Trojans Rented, Weaponized PDF, Token Theft + 26 More StoriesA vulnerability in Safetica ProcessMonitorDriver abused in a ransomware operation to terminate security processes. The driver was deployed alongside a Lenovo BootRepair.sys driver as part of an EDR-killing technique.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Oct 21, 2026Hackers Use Gentlemen Ransomware to Disable Windows Defender and Destroy Backups | Cryptika CybersecurityA vulnerability associated with Safetica ProcessMonitorDriver that The Gentlemen operation abuses through a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver tool to terminate security processes at the kernel level. This enables defense evasion in support of ransomware deployment. The content does not specify the underlying technical flaw.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Oct 21, 2026Hackers Use Gentlemen Ransomware to Disable Windows Defender and Destroy BackupsA vulnerability associated with Safetica ProcessMonitorDriver that The Gentlemen ransomware operation abuses through a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver tool to terminate security processes at the kernel level and weaken endpoint defenses.Read more ↗acronis blogNews · Oct 21, 2026The Gentlemen: A closer look at a not-so-gentle ransomware-as-a- service operationAn insufficiently protected IOCTL interface in Safetica ProcessMonitorDriver allows process termination through the kernel driver. In a recent incident involving The Gentlemen ransomware, an EDR-killing dropper deployed the vulnerable driver, loaded it as a service, and issued IOCTL requests to terminate targeted security processes.Read more ↗
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Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidence4Every report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malware4Malware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity5Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.