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An information exposure vulnerability in Datart v1.0.0-rc.3 allows an authenticated attacker to access sensitive data by supplying/abusing a custom H2 JDBC connection string, resulting in unintended data exposure.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository is a small PoC bundle for CVE-2025-70829 (Datart v1.0.0-rc.3) describing and enabling exploitation of an information exposure issue. Structure/purpose: - README.md / README_CN.md: Step-by-step exploitation guide. Core idea is abusing Datart’s “Data Source” feature to create an H2 source with a crafted JDBC URL that points to Datart’s own local H2 database file (./bin/h2/datart.demo). Once connected, attacker can run arbitrary SQL against internal tables to extract sensitive data (users, datasource configs). - jwttest.py (Python): Utility to forge a valid JWT Bearer token. It implements Java’s String.hashCode() to compute the integer value Datart expects in the JWT payload’s "password" field (derived from the stored password hash string). It then signs the token with a hardcoded secret (d@a$t%a^r&a*t) using HS256 and outputs a Bearer token for impersonation (e.g., sub=admin). - Decrypt.java (Java): Utility to decrypt encrypted datasource configuration values from the source table. It strips the “_encrypted_” prefix, Base64-decodes, and AES-decrypts using a deterministically derived AES key generated from the same hardcoded security key (d@a$t%a^r&a*t) via SHA1PRNG-seeded KeyGenerator. Exploit capabilities: 1) Authenticated information disclosure: read internal Datart H2 DB by pointing an H2 datasource at the local DB file. 2) Credential/config extraction: dump user password hashes and datasource records via SQL. 3) Privilege escalation/impersonation: forge JWTs for arbitrary users using hardcoded secret + password hashCode scheme. 4) Secret recovery: decrypt stored encrypted datasource configs to obtain cleartext external DB credentials. No hardcoded remote C2 or external network endpoints are present; the key “endpoints” are the local DB file path and the crafted JDBC URL used within the Datart UI.
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