CVE-2025-8191 is a reflected/client-side cross-site scripting vulnerability in macrozheng mall through version 1.0.3, affecting the Swagger UI component exposed at /swagger-ui/index.html. According to the provided content, an unknown function in this page processes the configUrl argument without sufficient validation or sanitization. By manipulating configUrl, an attacker can cause arbitrary script execution in the victim’s browser within the application’s origin. The issue is remotely exploitable and public exploit details are available.
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4 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
The repository contains one YAML-formatted Swagger 2.0 specification stored as test.json. Its sole purpose is to embed a malformed HTML/MathML/SVG payload in info.description. When a vulnerable Swagger/OpenAPI documentation renderer injects this description into the DOM without effective sanitization, the payload attempts to create an image with an onerror handler that runs alert(window.origin). This is a browser-side XSS proof of concept, not a network exploit or a detection-only script. The specification also declares a GET /accounts operation (operationId findAccounts), but no executable client code requests that endpoint.
This repository contains three YAML files (alert.yaml, alert2.yaml, alert3.yaml), each formatted as a Swagger/OpenAPI specification with a malicious payload in the 'title' field of the 'info' section. The payloads are crafted to execute JavaScript (alert popups or DOM modification) if the title is rendered as HTML in a vulnerable Swagger/OpenAPI documentation viewer or parser. The exploit demonstrates proof-of-concept XSS attacks targeting applications that do not properly sanitize the 'title' field when displaying API documentation. There are no network endpoints or hardcoded IPs; the exploit is file-based and relies on browser-based attack vectors. The repository is structured simply, with each file serving as a standalone XSS proof-of-concept.
This repository is a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2025-8191, targeting Swagger UI's ability to load external configuration files via the configURL parameter. The exploit consists of three files: a README.md with usage instructions and a vulnerable endpoint, a test.json file that acts as a malicious Swagger config referencing a crafted YAML file, and test.yaml, which contains a Swagger definition with an HTML injection payload. The payload injects a fake login form into the Swagger UI interface, demonstrating the risk of arbitrary HTML injection. The exploit does not provide a shell or code execution, but proves the ability to inject and display arbitrary HTML to users of the Swagger UI. The main attack vector is through a browser by tricking a user or administrator into loading the malicious config file in their Swagger UI instance.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2025-8191, a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Swagger UI versions 1.0.3 and below. The exploit is implemented in C (exploit.c) and generates a malicious Swagger configuration file (xss.json) with a JavaScript payload in the 'description' field. When this file is loaded by a vulnerable Swagger UI instance, the payload executes in the victim's browser, exfiltrating cookies to an attacker-controlled server. The exploit requires the attacker to specify both the target Swagger UI URL and their own server for data exfiltration. The repository includes a README with usage instructions and a LICENSE file. The main exploit logic is in exploit.c, which handles argument parsing, payload file creation, and sending the exploit request to the target.
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6 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.