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CVE-2026-0023 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Android's PackageInstallerService. The flaw is located in createSessionInternal of PackageInstallerService.java, where a missing permission check can allow an application to update its ownership improperly. By abusing this authorization weakness, a local app may be able to alter package ownership state in a way not intended by the platform's security model.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a local Android proof-of-concept lab for CVE-2026-0023, an Android PackageInstaller/Update Ownership trust bypass. It is not a remote exploit or malware kit; instead it demonstrates how a regular installer can influence an internal installation flag so Android suppresses the expected Update Ownership warning during updates on vulnerable builds. Repository structure: the project contains three separate Android Studio/Gradle apps. 'Safe Market' is a benign installer app that requests REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES and ENFORCE_UPDATE_OWNERSHIP, lets the user pick an APK via OpenDocument, writes it into a PackageInstaller session as 'base.apk', and commits the install while handling the result through an internal action string. 'Sample app' is the target/demo application ('Ownership Inspector') that audits and displays installer-of-record, update owner, package source, signer, and related metadata so the user can observe the trust chain before and after updates. 'Unsafe Market' is the key exploit component: it mirrors the installer workflow but adds two modes (normal and CVE path), includes the ChickenHook RestrictionBypass dependency, and defines constants for the internal flag name 'INSTALL_FROM_MANAGED_USER_OR_PROFILE' and SessionParams field 'installFlags', indicating reflective manipulation of PackageInstaller session parameters to reproduce the vulnerable behavior. Main exploit capability: the unsafe installer can create a PackageInstaller session for a user-selected APK and, in the CVE mode, attempt to set the internal managed-profile install flag that should only be controlled by the system. On vulnerable Android versions, this causes Android to treat the install as if it came from a managed profile context and suppress the Update Ownership warning that would normally appear when a different installer updates an app with an established update owner. The result is a trust/UI bypass affecting update provenance, not arbitrary code execution. Operationally, the PoC is mature enough to be considered OPERATIONAL: it contains working Android apps, UI flows, install-session handling, and a concrete payload path, but the payload is fixed to demonstrating the warning bypass rather than delivering a customizable post-exploitation capability. No network C2, hardcoded IPs, exfiltration endpoints, persistence, or destructive behavior were identified. The attack vector is strictly local and requires user/device access plus a vulnerable Android build.
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6 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.