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A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in parisneo/lollms versions prior to 2.2.0 in the /api/files/export-content endpoint. The issue is caused by the _download_image_to_temp() function in backend/routers/files.py, which does not properly validate or restrict user-controlled URLs before fetching remote content. An attacker can supply arbitrary URLs and cause the server to initiate HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations, including internal network services and cloud instance metadata endpoints. Based on the provided information, this can expose otherwise unreachable resources and may enable follow-on attacks such as information disclosure, internal port scanning, and potentially remote code execution depending on reachable internal services.
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/api/files/export-content endpoint, especially from untrusted users. Apply outbound network egress filtering so the application host cannot reach internal-only services or cloud metadata endpoints. Block requests to localhost, private address space, link-local ranges, and known metadata IPs such as 169.254.169.254. Disable unnecessary outbound HTTP access from the application environment and monitor for anomalous requests originating from the service.Patch, then assume compromise.
_download_image_to_temp() should be corrected to strictly validate and constrain user-supplied URLs. Remediation should include enforcing an allowlist of permitted schemes and destinations, blocking access to localhost, loopback, link-local, RFC1918/private, and cloud metadata address ranges, and preventing redirects to disallowed targets.No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.
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10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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