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On TP-Link Tapo C260 v1, a guest-level authenticated user can bypass intended access restrictions by sending crafted requests to a synchronization endpoint, enabling modification of protected device settings despite the user’s limited privileges. The issue is an authorization/access-control failure at the sync endpoint that permits state-changing operations that should be restricted to higher-privileged roles. The described outcome is unauthorized configuration/state manipulation rather than arbitrary code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a Python proof-of-concept exploit chain targeting TP-Link Tapo C260 IP cameras, claiming unauthenticated-to-root RCE by chaining three CVEs (CVE-2026-0651/0652/0653). Structure: (1) exploit.py implements the cloud-based RCE portion: it sends HTTPS POST requests to the TP-Link cloud API endpoint /v1/things/{device_id}/services-sync with mobile-app-like headers and an Authorization token. It first 'poisons' a device configuration value by abusing a passthrough multipleRequest containing method setLedStatus; crafted nested JSON keys write attacker-controlled data into the config path tp_manage/info/dev_name (arbitrary config write). It then 'triggers' execution by sending another passthrough request (testUsrDefAudio -> device_info.set_region_code) which, per comments/README, causes the device to read dev_name and pass it unsanitized into a popen()-backed command path, resulting in command injection and privilege escalation to root. Payload options include a netcat-based reverse shell (mkfifo + /bin/sh -i | nc), a curl callback, or an arbitrary command string. The script optionally restores dev_name after exploitation. (2) lfd.py is a separate local-network helper for CVE-2026-0651: it performs an HTTPS GET to https://{host}/stok={token}/%2e%2e%2f... to traverse out of /www and read arbitrary files (e.g., /etc/passwd), requiring a valid stok token. requirements.txt pins requests/urllib3. Overall purpose: demonstrate and automate the exploit chain (config poisoning + trigger) and provide a standalone file disclosure tool; TLS certificate verification is disabled in both scripts.
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6 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
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