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The User Language Switch plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF) in all versions up to and including 1.6.10. The issue is caused by missing URL validation in the download_language() function, which allows attacker-controlled URLs to be fetched by the WordPress application. An authenticated attacker with Administrator-level access or higher can abuse this behavior to induce the server to send arbitrary outbound HTTP requests to attacker-specified destinations, including internal network services or cloud/management endpoints that are not directly reachable from the Internet.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
Small repository containing a single Bash proof-of-concept script plus README, license, and .gitignore. The main file, poc-uls-ssrf.sh, is an authenticated SSRF exploit POC for the WordPress User Language Switch plugin, referenced as GHSA-m38c-5p3m-p7gm and labeled CVE-2026-0745. The script logs into a WordPress site using supplied credentials, stores cookies in a temporary jar, and then submits a POST request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=uls_download_language and info_language set to an arbitrary URL. This causes the vulnerable server-side component to fetch the supplied URL, demonstrating SSRF. The default proof target is the cloud metadata endpoint http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/, indicating the exploit’s primary capability is access to internal-only resources from the server’s network perspective. Output is limited to the first 800 bytes of the server response. There is no advanced payload management, persistence, or framework integration; it is a straightforward operational POC intended for local or lab validation.
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4 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.