CVE-2026-0827 is a local privilege escalation issue in Lenovo Diagnostics and the HardwareScanAddin component used by Lenovo Vantage. According to the provided description, during installation or while using the hardware scan functionality, a local authenticated user may be able to trigger an arbitrary file write performed with elevated privileges. The vulnerable condition appears to stem from insufficient restriction of file write targets or paths in a privileged execution context, allowing an attacker to influence where files are written.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small Visual Studio C# proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-0827 affecting Lenovo LDE on Windows. The project contains one meaningful exploit source file, CVE-2026-0827/Program.cs, plus standard solution/project metadata, App.config, package metadata, and a README. The exploit uses the NtApiDotNet library to manipulate NT object manager and filesystem primitives. Its core logic creates the attacker-controlled path C:\ProgramData\Lenovo\LDE\SYSTEM, sets that directory as a mount point to \RPC Control, and creates an NT symbolic link named MP27AM7W_estimation.json that points to an arbitrary destination file chosen by the user or defaulting to C:\Windows\System32\test.json. The operator is then instructed to trigger the Lenovo service so that when LdeApi.Server.exe writes the expected JSON file, the write is redirected and performed with SYSTEM privileges. This yields a local privilege escalation primitive in the form of arbitrary file write/overwrite. The exploit is not a scanner or detector and does not include a post-exploitation payload such as command execution or a shell; it is an operational local PoC demonstrating filesystem redirection abuse against a privileged service.
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