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Grav CMS versions 2.0.19 through 2.0.24 process page content through the Twig sandbox by default. The sandbox allowlists get_cookie(), allowing a page author with only page-write permission to retrieve any cookie submitted with the request, including an administrator's session cookie. Grav stores the rendered page output in a page-content cache keyed only by page identity and configuration checksum, without a session, user, or request-specific cache dimension. Consequently, attacker-authored content can cause an administrator's session identifier to be embedded in cached page output and subsequently disclosed to unauthenticated visitors. Versions 2.0.0 through 2.0.18 and 1.7.x are affected only when content Twig processing has been explicitly enabled. Grav 1.7.x has no backported fix.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This two-file repository contains a Python proof-of-concept/verifier for CVE-2026-100671 affecting Grav content Twig rendering and page caching. README.md documents the vulnerable chain, affected versions, lab prerequisites, execution, expected output, and remediation. exploit.py is the sole executable entry point and uses only Python standard-library HTTP tooling. The verifier is deliberately constrained to loopback targets (127.0.0.1, ::1, or localhost), rejects URL credentials and non-HTTP(S) schemes, validates page routes, limits response sizes, applies timeouts, and follows redirects only when they remain loopback-local. It requires writer and administrator credentials through command-line arguments or GRAV_* environment variables. It creates a public proof page carrying a Twig get_cookie() payload, authenticates an administrator to visit that page, requests the same page as the attacker, checks for a cached cookie marker, and attempts local API session replay. It reports only status/boolean results and avoids disclosing token, cookie, or response-body contents. The documented vulnerable condition is cache reuse of Twig-rendered page output across users: a low-privilege writer can cause an administrator session cookie to be rendered server-side, after which an unauthenticated requester can receive the cached value. Grav 2.0.19–2.0.24 are described as vulnerable under shipped default content-Twig settings; 2.0.0–2.0.18 and 1.7.x require explicitly enabled content Twig. Grav 2.0.25 is described as fixed. The repository is an operational local reproducibility PoC rather than a remote scanner or a credential-harvesting utility.
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