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vm2 versions before 3.12.2 contain an authorization bypass in the NodeVM external-module resolver. In configurations using a custom external-module resolver with host context, the resolver creates an insufficiently bounded regular-expression allowlist entry for a resolved module path. Untrusted guest code can load an allowlisted module and subsequently load a non-allowlisted sibling module whose absolute path shares that module's prefix. The sibling module is loaded by the host module loader, causing its top-level code to execute in the host process before exported values are restricted.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This eight-file standalone repository contains a Python 3 HTTP scanner/exploit driver (poc.py), a Node.js local reproduction (lab/poc.js), dependency manifests, target examples, and documentation. It targets the claimed vm2 NodeVM external-module resolver authorization flaw in versions before 3.12.2. The local lab installs vm2 3.11.5, creates both an allowed left-pad package and a colliding evil-left-pad package under a temporary custom resolver root, then runs guest code that loads the colliding package despite only left-pad being allowlisted. The colliding package executes in host context and imports child_process, demonstrating host-side command execution with a marker. The Python entry point accepts one target or a target list, normalizes HTTP(S) bases, fingerprints exposed package manifests and lockfiles for vm2 indicators/version data, and probes a configurable set of common JSON sandbox execution endpoints using several potential code-field names. It supports concurrent mass operation, optional execution probing, custom JavaScript payload files, callback URLs, proxying, disabled TLS verification, JSONL results, and exploited-target tracking. The remote workflow is opportunistic: endpoint exposure or a vm2 version match alone does not demonstrate exploitability without the required vulnerable NodeVM configuration and reachable colliding package.
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An authorization-bypass and sandbox-escape vulnerability in vm2's NodeVM external-module resolver. Under a custom require.external resolver with context set to host, insufficient path-boundary validation permits guest code to load a non-allowlisted sibling module whose path shares the allowlisted module's prefix, leading to host-process arbitrary code execution.
An authorization-bypass and sandbox-escape vulnerability in vm2 NodeVM's custom external-module resolver. Improper regular-expression path validation allows untrusted guest code to load a non-allowlisted sibling module whose path shares the allowlisted module's prefix, executing that module's top-level code in the host process and enabling arbitrary host-context code execution.
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