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Thinkware U3000 firmware through version 1.02.04 contains an improper access-control vulnerability in the TCP Service's PUT_FILE function. An attacker can manipulate the function's path argument to access files or file-system locations outside the intended authorization controls remotely.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
u3000py is a 20-file Python repository containing a reverse-engineered synchronous client and Click CLI for the Thinkware U3000 dashcam local Wi-Fi TCP protocol. The primary implementation is u3000py/client.py, with protocol constants in u3000py/protocol.py, Pydantic response models in models.py, CLI exposure in cli.py, unit tests, hardware tests, and a real-device CLI smoke test. The client opens the unauthenticated data socket on TCP/8787 before the JSON command socket on TCP/7878, performs a START_SESSION/SET_CLNT_INFO/APP_CONNECT handshake, and handles unsolicited notifications and concatenated JSON responses. It directly demonstrates CVE-2026-101054 by listing and downloading attacker-selected absolute paths, and CVE-2026-101055 by retrieving plaintext Wi-Fi credentials via wifi_info. It contains many control operations, including recording configuration, Wi-Fi/hotspot administration, resets, and SD-card formatting; destructive and connectivity-risky operations require confirm=True in the library and CLI confirmation. Documentation also describes CVE-2026-101053, unauthenticated arbitrary file write via PUT_FILE, but the implementation intentionally omits a public write-anywhere method. This is functional offensive-capable client code rather than a detection-only tool, though exploitation is limited to hosts already reachable on the camera's local network.
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1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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