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A path traversal vulnerability exists in Sanluan PublicCMS up to version 5.202506.d within the Task Template Management Handler. The issue is in the Save function of com/publiccms/controller/admin/sys/TaskTemplateAdminController.java, where a user-controllable path argument can be manipulated to traverse directories (e.g., via ../ sequences) and access filesystem locations outside the intended base directory. The attack is remotely exploitable and a public exploit is reported as available.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small proof-of-concept for a smart contract reentrancy issue described as CVE-2026-1111. It contains four files: a license, a README with vulnerability explanation and usage notes, a Solidity source file defining both the vulnerable contract and attacker contract, and a minimal Python script showing intended interaction through Web3. The core exploit logic is in VulnerableBank.sol. The VulnerableBank contract exposes deposit, withdraw, and transferTo functions. The vulnerability is that withdraw performs an external call to msg.sender before decrementing the sender balance, creating a reentrancy window. The bundled Attacker contract uses its fallback() function to re-enter the target during Ether receipt and invoke transferTo(address(this), 1 ether), demonstrating cross-function state manipulation during the vulnerable execution path. The attack() function seeds the bank with 1 ether and then calls withdraw(1 ether) to trigger the reentrant flow. The Python file exploit_reentrancy.py is not a full exploit implementation; it simply connects to a local JSON-RPC node at http://127.0.0.1:8545 and prints a success message while outlining the intended deployment/execution steps in comments. There is no automated compilation, ABI handling, deployment, or transaction crafting in the script. Overall, this is a conceptual and educational POC for Ethereum smart contract exploitation rather than a weaponized exploit. It targets a locally deployed vulnerable contract and demonstrates unauthorized fund extraction via cross-function reentrancy.
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2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.