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CVE-2026-11112 is an insufficient input validation vulnerability in the Chromoting component of Google Chrome on Linux prior to version 149.0.7827.53. The flaw allows untrusted input to be processed without adequate validation in a way that can be leveraged by an attacker who has already achieved compromise of the renderer process. By using a crafted Chrome extension, the attacker may be able to cross the browser's sandbox boundary and escape the renderer sandbox. Chromium rated the issue as medium severity.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone Python proof-of-concept for an XXE vulnerability in SVG upload handling, labeled as CVE-2026-11112. It contains two code files: a vulnerable Flask server (xxe_upload_server.py) and a client-side exploit script (exploit_xxe_svg.py). The server exposes a POST /upload route, reads raw request data, and parses it with lxml using resolve_entities=True and no_network=False, which is the core unsafe behavior enabling XXE. The exploit script sends a crafted SVG/XML document to http://localhost:5000/upload with a DOCTYPE that defines an external entity pointing to file:///etc/passwd; when the server parses the XML, the entity is expanded and the file contents are reflected in the response. Repository structure is minimal and clearly demonstration-oriented: README.md explains the vulnerability and usage, exploit_xxe_svg.py performs the attack, and xxe_upload_server.py provides a reproducible vulnerable target. The main exploit capability demonstrated is arbitrary file read from the server filesystem. Based on the parser settings and README claims, the same primitive could be adapted for SSRF or internal network interaction by changing the external entity target. This is not a detection script and not framework-based; it is an operational PoC with a hardcoded payload and target.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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