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A SQL injection vulnerability in Yonyou KSOA 9.0 affects the /worksheet/work_info.jsp endpoint within the HTTP GET parameter handling logic. By manipulating the GET parameter "ID", an attacker can inject SQL into backend database queries. The issue is remotely exploitable and a public exploit has been disclosed; the specific internal function is not identified in the provided content.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small proof-of-concept demonstrating an IoT firmware signature bypass scenario based on improper Ed25519 public-key/subgroup validation. It is not a real-world weaponized exploit against a named vendor product, but a local simulation of the vulnerability class described as CVE-2026-1122. Repository structure: 4 files total: LICENSE, README.md, forge_firmware.py, and vulnerable_ed25519_verify.c. The two code files are the core of the PoC. forge_firmware.py is the main exploit artifact generator: it creates three local files—malicious.bin, malicious.sig, and malicious.pub. The firmware file contains a placeholder malicious payload string ("Malicious payload: reverse shell"), while the signature is 64 null bytes and the public key is 32 null bytes. The script's purpose is to simulate forging firmware artifacts that would be accepted by a broken verifier. The C file, vulnerable_ed25519_verify.c, is a mock vulnerable verifier. It explicitly documents the missing subgroup check and simulates unsafe acceptance logic by rejecting only when pub[31] has its low bit set; otherwise it prints "Signature accepted (vulnerable)" and returns success. The main() function hardcodes a zeroed signature, zeroed public key, and the message "malicious firmware", then calls ed25519_verify(). This confirms the repository is a local demonstration of signature verification bypass rather than a network exploit. Capabilities: the exploit demonstrates malicious firmware generation, forged signature/public-key artifact creation, and bypass of a vulnerable firmware verification routine. The intended security impact is arbitrary firmware injection and persistent device compromise. There are no network callbacks, C2 endpoints, remote URLs, or hardcoded IPs/domains. All observable endpoints are local file artifacts and local execution paths. Overall, this is a concise educational PoC for a cryptographic implementation flaw in Ed25519 verification logic, specifically failure to reject malformed or small-order public keys during OTA firmware validation.
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3 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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