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CVE-2026-11784 is a Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability in the Optimole – Optimize Images | Convert WebP & AVIF | CDN & Lazy Load | Image Optimization plugin for WordPress affecting all versions up to and including 4.2.6. The issue is caused by missing or incorrect nonce validation in the plugin's replace_file function. An attacker can induce a logged-in victim to submit a forged multipart POST request that targets a media attachment ID. Although the vulnerable handler enforces a current_user_can('edit_post', $id) authorization check, it does not properly protect the action against CSRF, allowing the request to execute in the victim's authenticated session. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can overwrite existing media attachments with attacker-supplied file content for any attachment the victim is permitted to edit.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-11784 affecting the Optimole WordPress plugin (versions <= 4.2.5). It contains two files: a README describing the vulnerability and impact, and a single exploit page at exploit/csrf-poc.html. The exploit is not part of a larger framework. The main capability is browser-based CSRF against the WordPress admin AJAX endpoint. The HTML page builds a multipart/form-data POST request to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the action optml_replace_file and a chosen attachment_id, then attempts to upload a replacement file. To satisfy image validation, the JavaScript generates a mathematically valid 1x1 JPEG from an embedded Base64 blob and packages it as overwritten_asset.jpg before auto-submitting the form. Operationally, the exploit demonstrates arbitrary overwrite of an existing media library asset when a logged-in victim with permission to edit the attachment visits the page. The README also notes possible escalation paths if overwritten content can lead to stored XSS, but the included code itself only demonstrates file replacement. One implementation issue is visible in the PoC: it references data.items.add(file) and data.files without showing initialization of a DataTransfer object, so the sample may require minor correction to run as-is. Despite that, the exploit intent and target workflow are clear and valid as a CSRF PoC.
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1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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