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CriticalExploited in the wildCISA KEVPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2026-1281: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile

Published Jan 29, 2026 · Updated 8 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
CVSS9.8Critical · v3.1
EPSS98.7%100th percentile
CISA KEVYesAdded Jan 29, 2026
In the wildActivePer CISA KEV
Vendor
Ivanti
IdentifiersCVE-2026-1281CWE-94 · Improper Control of Generation of…
Also known asivanti_endpoint_manager_mobile_(epmm)_cve_2026_1281

CVE-2026-1281 is a critical code-injection vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM), formerly MobileIron Core. An Apache RewriteMap handler associated with In-House Application Distribution passes attacker-controlled request values into unsafe Bash arithmetic evaluation. Specially crafted HTTP GET requests can trigger command substitution and execute arbitrary commands without authentication. Affected releases include EPMM 12.7.0.0 and earlier vulnerable branches. The vulnerability has a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8, has been actively exploited, and is included in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation compromises the EPMM appliance's confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Observed intrusions include webshell deployment, reverse shells, malware execution, and copying and exfiltration of the EPMM database. Depending on configuration, exposed information can include device identifiers and locations, user records, directory-service credentials, Microsoft 365 tokens, and cryptographic material. Appliance compromise can support persistent access, configuration changes, service disruption, and lateral movement into connected systems. Control over managed devices and access through associated Ivanti Sentry environments are potential downstream consequences, not guaranteed outcomes.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Restrict network access to EPMM using a VPN, trusted-source allowlists, and network segmentation; WAF filtering can provide supplementary protection but does not replace patching. Investigate exposed deployments using the latest Ivanti/NCSC exploitation-detection package and independent forensic review, because a clean scan does not exclude compromise. Preserve logs off the appliance and monitor for suspicious requests, altered web content, unexpected application archives, and unusual outbound or long-running connections. Isolate suspected compromised EPMM appliances and associated Sentry systems from Internet and internal access without powering them off before evidence preservation. Investigate connected systems and cloud authentication activity for credential misuse and lateral movement.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Apply the current Ivanti-approved fix for the installed EPMM branch and upgrade to a supported release incorporating the permanent correction. Interim version-specific RPM fixes replace vulnerable Bash mappings with Java implementations and must be reapplied after upgrades until a release incorporating the permanent fix is installed; EPMM 12.8.0.0 is identified as the permanent-fix release. Do not rely on patching to remove an existing compromise. For confirmed compromise, rebuild the appliance or restore a verified clean backup while isolated, then patch before reconnecting it. Reset local, directory-service, and integrated-service credentials; revoke and replace exposed certificates, private keys, and tokens. If keys were stored on the appliance, revoke and regenerate affected user certificates.

Public exploits

Exploits

2 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis. Hidden: 2 rejected by Mallory's analysis as not a working exploit; 1 not yet analyzed, such as Exploit-DB entries.

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CVE-2026-1281-Ivanti-EPMM-RCERepository purpose: an operational PoC toolkit for unauthenticated RCE against Ivanti EPMM via CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340. The exploit abuses a crafted URL path under /mifs/c/(appstore|aftstore)/fob/ where parameters include st=theValue␠␠ and h=gPath[`<command>`], leveraging Bash arithmetic/command substitution behavior (as described) to execute arbitrary commands pre-auth. Structure and key files: - exploit.py (Python): primary exploit client. Implements (1) endpoint reachability checks for /mifs/c/appstore/fob/ and /mifs/c/aftstore/fob/ (treating 400/403/404 as indicative of presence), (2) payload construction embedding gPath[`cmd`] into the h parameter with a fixed kid=1 and et=1337133713, and (3) exploitation via GET requests to /mifs/c/*store*/fob/3/5/sha256:<params>/<fake_guid>. CLI supports: --check, --test-rce (sleep-based), -x/--execute arbitrary command, --webshell (JSP dropper), and --reverse-shell IP:PORT. - validate.py (Python): automated validation framework that repeatedly builds exploit URLs and runs multiple tests (endpoint accessibility, time-based sleep injection, file-write marker, etc.), logging results and exporting a JSON report. - PAYLOADS.md / REDTEAM_GUIDE.md (Markdown): extensive operator playbook and payload catalog (reverse shells, webshells, persistence, exfiltration, recon/pivoting). These documents include many example commands and internal/external endpoints used for callbacks and testing. - detect_compromise.sh (Bash): blue-team/IR IOC scanner for EPMM hosts. Scans /var/log/httpd/https-access_log for exploit markers (gPath[, theValue, vulnerable paths, and common command tokens), searches /mi and /mi/tomcat for recently modified JSPs and webshell patterns, checks for patch indicators (RPM ivanti-security-update-1761642 and presence of specific .class files), and packages evidence into a tar.gz. Exploit capabilities (as implemented/documented): - Pre-auth network RCE via crafted HTTP GET request path. - RCE confirmation via time delay (sleep). - Arbitrary command execution; optional webshell deployment and reverse-shell callback (operator-supplied LHOST:LPORT). - Post-exploitation guidance includes persistence (SSH keys, cron, systemd), credential harvesting, and data exfiltration (DNS/HTTP), though many of these are documented payloads rather than hardcoded in the exploit core. Notable observables for defenders: - Requests to /mifs/c/(aft|app)store/fob/ with parameters containing st=theValue␠␠ and h=gPath[`...`], often resulting in 404 responses. - Potential dropped artifacts under /mi/tomcat/webapps/ROOT/*.jsp, modified error JSPs (401.jsp/403.jsp/404.jsp/500.jsp), and marker files under /tmp. - Outbound callbacks to operator-controlled IP:PORT (examples use 10.10.14.5:4444) and possible DNS queries to attacker.com for exfiltration.MehdiLeDeaut · Disclosed Feb 7, 2026 · python · bash · networkOperationalCVE-2026-1281-CVE-2026-1340-Ivanti-EPMM-RCERepository purpose: a Dockerized dummy target that reproduces the Ivanti EPMM pre-auth RCE class (CVE-2026-1281 / CVE-2026-1340) in a simplified, educational setup. How the exploit works (core bug): - `scripts/map-appstore-url` is a Bash CGI script that URL-decodes `REQUEST_URI`, extracts the `sha256:<params>` segment, and splits it into comma-separated key=value pairs. - During parsing, it sets `gStartTime` from the `st=` parameter and later sets `theValue` from the last processed parameter (notably `h=`). The loop variable `theValue` persists after the loop. - If the attacker sets `st=theValue␠␠` (literal string plus padding to reach length 10) and sets `h=gPath[`<cmd>`]`, then later the script evaluates `[[ ${currentTime} -gt ${gStartTime} ]]`. - In Bash, the `-gt` comparison triggers arithmetic evaluation; the string `theValue` is treated as a variable reference, expanding to the attacker-controlled `theValue` content (`gPath[`cmd`]`). The array index contains backticks, causing command substitution and thus remote command execution. Exploit capabilities demonstrated: - Arbitrary command execution as the CGI process user (in the container, examples show root-like output in artifacts). - File write/creation under `/mi` (mounted to `./artifacts`) to prove execution. - Time-based execution (`sleep N`) to confirm RCE without relying on output. Repository structure: - `Dockerfile`: builds a Debian-based container with nginx + fcgiwrap, installs the vulnerable CGI script, and prints example vulnerable URLs on startup. - `nginx.conf`: exposes `/health` and routes `/mifs/c/appstore/fob/3/<int>/sha256:<...>/<name>.ipa` to the CGI script via fcgiwrap. - `scripts/map-appstore-url`: the vulnerable Bash CGI implementation and logging. - `docker-compose.yml`: runs the container on host port 8180 and mounts `./artifacts` to `/mi` for observing exploit artifacts. - `test-exploit.sh`: automated local test suite that hits `/health` and sends exploit requests to create/write files and perform a time-based check. - `README.md`: explains the vulnerability chain and provides example curl payloads. Notable observables/fingerprintable targets: - HTTP endpoints: `/health` and the regex-matched `/mifs/c/appstore/fob/3/.../.ipa` path. - Local artifact paths: `/mi/*` in-container and `./artifacts/*` on host. - Potential documentation inconsistency: README includes an example using `localhost:81080` while compose maps `8180:80`.YunfeiGE18 · Disclosed Feb 19, 2026 · bash · dockerfile · network (pre-auth HTTP request to nginx/CGI endpoint leading to bash command execution)PoC
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
IvantiEndpoint Manager Mobileapplication
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2026-1281 exploited in the wild?
Yes. As of Nov 9, 2026, Mallory has reports of exploitation in the wild, and CISA added it to KEV on Jan 29, 2026.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2026-1281?
Yes. Mallory tracks 2 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2026-1281, the earliest disclosed Feb 7, 2026.
Is there a patch for CVE-2026-1281?
Apply the current Ivanti-approved fix for the installed EPMM branch and upgrade to a supported release incorporating the permanent correction. Interim version-specific RPM fixes replace vulnerable Bash mappings with Java implementations and must be reapplied after upgrades until a release incorporating the permanent fix is installed; EPMM 12.8.0.0 is identified as the permanent-fix release.
What products are affected by CVE-2026-1281?
Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile.
How severe is CVE-2026-1281?
CVE-2026-1281 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8 (Critical) and an EPSS score of 98.7% (100th percentile) as of Nov 9, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

386 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, and which detections to deploy tonight.
Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidence8Every report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malware15Malware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signatures3YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity118Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.