CVE-2026-15013 is an unauthenticated authentication-bypass vulnerability in the WordPress SAML Single Sign On – SSO Login (miniOrange SAML SSO) plugin through version 5.4.3. During SAML response validation, Mo_SAML_Utilities::mo_saml_cast_key() accepts the SignatureMethod algorithm specified in the attacker-controlled SAMLResponse rather than requiring the locally configured signature algorithm. An attacker can select HMAC-SHA1, causing the configured identity provider RSA public key to be treated as an HMAC shared secret and enabling validation of a forged SAML assertion.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a standalone Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2026-15013 affecting the miniOrange SAML Single Sign On WordPress plugin up to version 5.4.3. The repo contains a main exploit script (exploit.py), a README describing the vulnerability and usage, dependency metadata, and Docker lab files for reproducing the issue against a vulnerable WordPress instance. The exploit workflow is clearly offensive and multi-stage: it first fingerprints the target as WordPress, detects the vulnerable plugin version via its readme, discovers SAML service provider metadata and the IdP issuer, obtains or derives the HMAC key from the IdP public certificate, enumerates WordPress users through REST API endpoints, forges HMAC-SHA1 signed SAML assertions for candidate usernames, and attempts login until it obtains an administrator session. After admin access, it uploads a malicious WordPress plugin containing a PHP command webshell and optionally triggers a reverse shell to an attacker-controlled host and port. The exploit is not part of a known framework such as Metasploit or Nuclei. It is operational rather than a simple detector because it includes a working payload path: authenticated bypass, privilege abuse, plugin upload, command execution, and optional reverse shelling. The embedded PHP payload is a simple webshell that executes arbitrary commands passed in the c query parameter using shell_exec. The Docker files build a local vulnerable WordPress + MariaDB environment and fetch plugin version 5.4.3 from WordPress downloads, indicating the repository is intended both for lab reproduction and exploitation validation.
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