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CVE-2026-16277 is a stack-based buffer overflow in the rpcinfo utility shipped with rpcbind. The flaw is in rpcbaddrlist(), the code path used by rpcinfo -l when querying a remote rpcbind service. Address-list reply fields returned by RPCBPROC_GETADDRLIST are copied into a fixed-size stack buffer (char buf[128]) without sufficient bounds checking. Specifically, attacker-controlled reply strings such as the network protocol family and protocol fields can exceed the available buffer space and overwrite adjacent stack memory. The vulnerability is triggered by a malicious or compromised remote rpcbind server returning crafted response data to a client running rpcinfo with the -l option.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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rpcinfo -l against untrusted, attacker-controlled, or potentially compromised rpcbind servers until patched updates are applied. Restrict administrative use of rpcinfo to trusted hosts and trusted network paths. Where operationally feasible, limit exposure to untrusted rpcbind services and use platform versions that already incorporate the fix. OpenBSD is not affected in the same way because its rpcinfo implementation does not provide the vulnerable option behavior.Patch, then assume compromise.
-l handling path, specifically the rpcbaddrlist() processing of RPCBPROC_GETADDRLIST reply fields. For affected downstream platforms, install the relevant security updates provided by the operating system or rpcbind package maintainer. Microsoft indicates affected Mariner systems should receive the vendor-provided security updates for CVE-2026-16277.No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.