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CVE-2026-18322 is an improper privilege-management vulnerability in Smart Popup by Supsystic for WordPress through version 1.12.0. A permission-map collision in havePermissions() causes the popup save action to be omitted from administrator-restricted actions. The exposed unauthenticated save operation accepts a generic nonce included in subscription-confirmation emails, while createWpSubscriber() does not enforce a server-side allowlist of permitted WordPress roles. An attacker can modify the subscriber role setting to administrator and invoke the confirmation workflow to create an administrator account with attacker-selected credentials.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This 21-file security-research repository documents CVE-2026-18322 in the WordPress Smart Popup by Supsystic plugin. Versions earlier than 1.13.0 are affected. The vulnerability chain combines a permission-map merge collision that unintentionally exposes popup::save to unauthenticated requests, reuse of a generic anonymous pps_nonce in subscription confirmation email, and absent server-side validation of the configured WordPress user role. Together, these flaws permit setting the subscriber role to administrator and creating an administrator account through the normal subscription workflow. The repository has two distinct Python components. poc/cve_2026_18322_check.py is a GET-only passive checker that requests a target homepage and the plugin readme.txt, extracts version evidence from assets/readme metadata, and classifies versions below 1.13.0 as vulnerable. Tests enforce that this checker has no write verbs and never accesses admin-ajax.php. lab/exploit_full_chain.py is a real full-chain demonstration that creates an administrator, but is hard-gated to local/private targets and requires explicit --lab-confirm. The lab directory supplies a disposable Docker Compose stack comprising WordPress, MariaDB, and Mailpit, all externally bound only to 127.0.0.1. Bash setup/teardown/verification scripts install the vulnerable plugin release, configure a normal double-opt-in WordPress subscription popup, verify newly created administrative accounts, and destroy state afterward. PHP provisioning initializes the benign subscriber role; the exploit changes it. Documentation and three patch files provide root-cause analysis and show the 1.13.0 fixes: recursive permission merging, a role allowlist, and a dedicated confirmation nonce. scripts/fetch_versions.sh retrieves upstream plugin versions and regenerates the evidence diffs.
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4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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