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CVE-2026-18718 is an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in Ghidra’s Swift demangler analysis workflow. The issue resides in the handling of the Swift tool directory path persisted in a Ghidra project. When a project is opened, SwiftDemanglerAnalyzer restores the stored Swift binary directory from project state, and SwiftNativeDemangler subsequently resolves and executes a binary from that location without integrity or signature verification. An attacker can craft a malicious Ghidra project so that the restored Swift tool directory points to attacker-controlled executables. If a victim opens the project, the attacker-controlled binary is executed automatically under the security context of the Ghidra process user, without prompt or confirmation.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a single Python entrypoint, CVE-2026-18718-POC.py, plus supporting Markdown documentation (README, classification, source-evidence) and a license. The code is a standalone research/PoC framework, not tied to Metasploit/Nuclei or another common exploit framework. Its primary capability is reproducing the accepted Ghidra Swift demangler arbitrary code execution condition affecting Ghidra <= 12.1.2: if an attacker-controlled Swift tool directory is restored from project/analyzer state, Ghidra resolves and executes a binary named swift-demangle from that directory. The PoC safely simulates this by creating a fake local demangler and, when explicitly enabled with --execute, launching it as Ghidra would; with --launch-calc it can additionally spawn a benign calculator as a visible execution marker. The repository also includes two secondary research modes: tracermi, which scans/source-documents conditional execution sinks in Ghidra TraceRMI debugger agents (execute/eval style methods), and sevenzip, which documents reachability of bundled native SevenZip parsing code from untrusted archive input. Those two modes are evidence/scanning oriented rather than full weaponized exploitation. No network C2, remote callback, or destructive behavior is present. Attack surface is primarily local/file-based: opening or importing attacker-supplied Ghidra content that carries a malicious Swift tool path, or reviewing source trees for additional risky sinks. Overall maturity is operational PoC: it includes a working local execution demonstration and payload marker, but payload behavior is intentionally constrained and safety-gated.
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