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Improper input validation in PACM prior to SMR Feb-2026 Release 1 allows a physical attacker to execute arbitrary commands.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a complete chained exploit for Samsung Android devices across three vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-20980 (AT command filter bypass), CVE-2026-20981 (command injection in FacAtFunction via AT+CAMEAUTO), and CVE-2026-20982 (arbitrary file write/path traversal in ShortcutService restoreBitmapsFromBackupService). Structure is minimal: one Python orchestrator (PoC/at.py), one Java payload source for the final stage (PoC/CVE-2026-20982/Exploit.java), and a README explaining the chain. PoC/at.py is the main entry point. It waits for a Samsung/CDC ACM serial device, opens the serial port, and sends AT commands that switch the device into AP command mode. It then exploits the AT parser bypass by embedding a second command with mixed-case prefix (aT+) to reach the unregistered/protected AT+CAMEAUTO handler. That handler is abused for shell command injection, apparently staging a payload and creating a local netcat listener on port 1234. After that, the script uses adb to wait for the device, push base.apk and classes.dex into /data/log/, and execute app_process with the pushed dex so the Java exploit runs on-device. Finally it starts an Android service (com.vikram.shell/.Server) and opens another listener on port 8080. Exploit.java is the final privilege-escalation/file-write stage. It obtains a system context, then directly talks to the Android shortcut binder service using interface token android.content.pm.IShortcutService and transaction code 27 (restoreBitmapsFromBackupService). The code abuses unsanitized folder and filename parameters to perform path traversal writes outside the intended bitmap directory. One call copies /data/log/base.apk into a traversed target under /data/app/vikram_shell/base.apk. Another call first patches package metadata by converting /data/system/packages.xml with abx2xml, modifying XML, and writing /data/log/packages-backup.xml, then uses the same binder primitive to write that file to /data/system/packages-backup.xml. The intent is to gain code execution in system_server or otherwise elevate beyond the initial system app context. The README aligns with the code and documents the vulnerability chain, including the vulnerable components (at_distributor/libpacm_client.so, FacAtFunction, ShortcutService), the bypass logic, and the rationale for using uid 1000 permissions from the second stage to reach the third stage. This is a real exploit repository, not just documentation or detection logic.
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1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.