CVE-2026-21016 is an incorrect privilege assignment vulnerability in Samsung LocationManager affecting versions prior to Samsung Security Maintenance Release (SMR) May-2026 Release 1. The flaw allows a local attacker to obtain access to sensitive information because privileges are assigned more broadly than intended within the LocationManager component. The available information indicates an authorization or privilege-boundary failure in a system component responsible for location-related services, resulting in unintended data exposure to a locally present attacker.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a minimal proof-of-concept for a malicious Python package installation hook abusing setup.py execution during pip install. The repository contains four files: LICENSE, README.md, setup.py, and exploit_pypi_install.sh. The core exploit logic is in setup.py, which imports setuptools and os, then immediately runs os.system('id > /tmp/pwned_by_package') before invoking setup(). This means arbitrary shell commands execute as soon as the package is installed, demonstrating code execution in the package installation phase. The shell script exploit_pypi_install.sh simply triggers the behavior with 'pip install ./harmless-pkg' and then reads '/tmp/pwned_by_package' to confirm execution. There are no network callbacks, C2 endpoints, or remote exploit stages in the code; the attack is a supply-chain/local installation vector. The practical capability is arbitrary command execution under the installing user's privileges, and the sample payload is benign proof-of-execution rather than a full post-exploitation implant.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.