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HCL BigFix Service Management contains an improper access-control security misconfiguration that permits an authenticated user to view restricted data elements associated with other tenants. The flaw affects tenant-boundary authorization enforcement and results in cross-tenant information disclosure.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains two Python scripts and two Markdown reports centered on CVE-2026-21847, a claimed hardcoded AES key exposure in the DPDC subscription portal JavaScript bundle. The main code files are `cve_poc_simple.py`, a lightweight demonstrator that downloads `https://subscription.dpdatacenter.com/js/app.1773634386574.js`, checks for a known embedded key, prints exposed localStorage keys, and lists internal API routes; and `dpdccve_scanner.py`, a larger scanner/reporting tool with CLI options for subdomain enumeration, key extraction, and report generation. The exploit capability is not a memory corruption or RCE payload; instead it is a web/browser token-compromise workflow: identify the hardcoded client-side AES key, use it to decrypt browser-stored authentication tokens, then reuse those tokens against DPDC API endpoints for unauthorized access. The repository also documents related infrastructure such as `subscription.dpdatacenter.com`, `api.dpdatacenter.com`, `web.dpdatacenter.com`, and `web2.dpdatacenter.com`, plus several API paths including `/customer/information`, `/vm-instances/reboot-vm`, and `/whmcpanel/get-bulk-account-summary`. Overall, this is an operational PoC/scanner for credential/token abuse against a web application with client-side cryptographic key exposure, not just a README or pure detector.
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2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.