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MONAI (Medical Open Network for AI) versions up to and including 1.5.1 contain a path traversal (Zip Slip) vulnerability in the _download_from_ngc_private() function. The vulnerable code uses Python’s zipfile.ZipFile.extractall() to extract an attacker-influenced ZIP archive without validating member paths, allowing archive entries with ../ sequences or absolute paths to escape the intended extraction directory. Other similar download paths in the codebase use MONAI’s existing safe_extract_member() helper, but _download_from_ngc_private() did not. The issue is fixed by commit 4014c8475626f20f158921ae0cf98ed259ae4d59, which replaces unsafe extraction with MONAI’s safe extraction logic.
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source="ngc_private" and restrict that workflow. Enforce strict access control and monitoring on NGC private repositories to prevent attacker-controlled bundle uploads. Run MONAI with least privilege and in a constrained environment (e.g., containerization, minimized filesystem write access, read-only filesystem where feasible) to reduce the impact of arbitrary file writes.Patch, then assume compromise.
4014c8475626f20f158921ae0cf98ed259ae4d59. Ensure _download_from_ngc_private() no longer calls zipfile.ZipFile.extractall() directly and instead uses MONAI’s safe extraction routine (e.g., _extract_zip / safe_extract_member) that enforces extraction-root containment for all archive members.1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains two Python scripts and two Markdown reports centered on CVE-2026-21847, a claimed hardcoded AES key exposure in the DPDC subscription portal JavaScript bundle. The main code files are `cve_poc_simple.py`, a lightweight demonstrator that downloads `https://subscription.dpdatacenter.com/js/app.1773634386574.js`, checks for a known embedded key, prints exposed localStorage keys, and lists internal API routes; and `dpdccve_scanner.py`, a larger scanner/reporting tool with CLI options for subdomain enumeration, key extraction, and report generation. The exploit capability is not a memory corruption or RCE payload; instead it is a web/browser token-compromise workflow: identify the hardcoded client-side AES key, use it to decrypt browser-stored authentication tokens, then reuse those tokens against DPDC API endpoints for unauthorized access. The repository also documents related infrastructure such as `subscription.dpdatacenter.com`, `api.dpdatacenter.com`, `web.dpdatacenter.com`, and `web2.dpdatacenter.com`, plus several API paths including `/customer/information`, `/vm-instances/reboot-vm`, and `/whmcpanel/get-bulk-account-summary`. Overall, this is an operational PoC/scanner for credential/token abuse against a web application with client-side cryptographic key exposure, not just a README or pure detector.
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