CVE-2026-22010 is an easily exploitable vulnerability in the Platform component of Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications Infrastructure, part of Oracle Financial Services Applications. Affected versions are 8.0.7.9, 8.0.8.7, and 8.1.2.5. The vulnerability is reachable over HTTP and can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access. Successful exploitation allows compromise of the application resulting in unauthorized access to sensitive information stored in or accessible through the affected Oracle Financial Services Analytical Applications Infrastructure deployment. The available information indicates a high confidentiality impact and does not describe integrity or availability effects, nor does it identify the specific vulnerable function or root cause.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small proof-of-concept demonstrating Android intent redirection / permission bypass behavior associated with CVE-2026-22010. The core vulnerable logic appears twice in Java files (VulnActivity.java and duplicate VulnActivities.java): an exported Android Activity reads attacker-controlled extras 'pkg' and 'cls' from the incoming intent, builds a new Intent with setClassName(targetPkg, targetCls), copies all original extras with putExtras(...), and launches the chosen component via startActivity(...). This enables an attacker to redirect execution into an internal or protected activity if the app fails to validate the destination component. Repository structure is minimal: README.md explains the issue and gives an adb exploitation example; the two Java files simulate the vulnerable Android component; exploit_android_intent_redirect.py is not a functional exploit script and only prints a conceptual description. There is no network communication, no remote C2, and no automated payload delivery. The exploit capability is local to the Android device/emulator context and primarily demonstrates unauthorized launching of internal activities with attacker-controlled extras, which could lead to access to private functionality or data theft depending on the target app.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.